Vigilia

Vigilia: Securing Smart Home Edge Computing

Smart home IoT devices are becoming increasingly popular. Modern programmable smart home hubs such as SmartThings enable homeowners to manage devices in
sophisticated ways to save energy, improve security, and provide conveniences. Unfortunately, many smart home systems contain vulnerabilities, potentially impacting home security and privacy.

We have created Vigilia, a system that shrinks the attack surface of smart home IoT systems by restricting the network access of devices. As existing smart home systems are closed, we have created an open implementation of a similar programming and configuration model in Vigilia and extended the execution environment to maximally restrict communications by instantiating device-based network permissions. Please read our Vigilia paper from here to find out more.

Downloads

  • Please get the source code and the documentation for Vigilia using git. After the download process is over, you can find the documentation in the PDF format inside the folder iot2.
     git clone git://plrg.eecs.uci.edu/iot2.git
  • Please read the documentation to install the necessary software and hardware for Vigilia. For the Vigilia router, you can download the modified LEDE/OpenWrt firmware also by using git. The installation of this firmware is also covered in the documentation file and the README file inside the lede folder.
     git clone git://plrg.eecs.uci.edu/lede.git

See Also

The Vigilia source and the accompanying benchmarks source on Gitweb:

http://plrg.eecs.uci.edu/git/?p=iot2.git

Disclaimer

We make no warranties that Vigilia is free of errors. Please read the paper and the documentation file so that you understand what the tool is supposed to do.

Contact

Please feel free to contact us for more information. Bug reports are welcome, and we are happy to hear from our users.

Contact Rahmadi Trimananda at rtrimana@uci.edu or Brian Demsky at bdemsky@uci.edu for questions about Vigilia.

Copyright

Copyright © 2018 Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.

Acknowledgments

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under grants CCF-1319786, CNS-1613023, CNS-1703598, CNS-1763172, OAC-1740210 and by the Office of Naval Research under grants N00014-16-1-2913 and N00014-18-1-2037.

Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.